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1 This Policy Insight originates from remarks prepared for the conference “Institutions and the crisis” held in Florence in April 
2018. A previous version of it was published under the title “Euro area reform: Reflection on an initiative” in Allen et al. (2018). 
I am grateful to Agnès Bénassy-Quéré and Isabel Schnabel for comments on an earlier draft and I am especially indebted to 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, with whom I extensively discussed the relevance and implications of the contributions to the VoxEU 
debate that we moderated jointly between April and July 2018.     
2 I must admit that I contributed (modestly) to this literature. 
3 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/20180629-euro-summit-statement/
4 https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2018/2018-06-19-meseberg-declaration.html
5	 The	authoritative	account	is	James	(2014).	The	first	chapters	of	Mody	(2018)	provide	a	(very)	critical	review	of	the	discussions	
leading up to the launch of the euro. 
The euro is nearly 20 years old – ten quiet years followed by ten tumultuous ones. The	 end	of	 the	first	 decade	was	marked	by	
glowing, oddly uncritical reviews.2 Ten years 
later, however, complacency has largely vanished 
from assessments of the state of the euro area and 
disagreements over its future remain unsolved. 
Already six years ago, the heads of the European 
institutions issued a blueprint for the future, the 
Four Presidents’ Report of June 2012 (Van Rompuy 
et al., 2012), and in a statement on 29 June 2012 
the euro area heads of state agreed on “breaking 
the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns” 
by establishing a banking union.3	 Much	 has	
been done for sure, but the agenda endorsed 
by the leaders has not been completed and the 
roadmap	for	the	future	remains	a	matter	of	fierce	
controversy. At their June 2018 summit, despite 
the prior Franco-German rapprochement and the 
joint	‘Meseberg	Declaration’	by	President	Macron	
and	 Chancellor	 Merkel,4 the euro area heads of 
state could only agree to call for further work on a 
series of still-divisive issues. 
The nature of disagreements
Why	is	it	so	difficult	to	agree?	Why	is	it	so	difficult	
for countries that jointly decided almost 30 
years ago to embark on what they knew was an 
extremely	ambitious	endeavour	to	find	agreement	
on	 directions	 for	 reform?	 The	 architects	 of	 the	
euro were fully aware of the incomplete nature 
of	 the	 contract	 written	 down	 in	 the	 Maastricht	
Treaty. They knew, or at least they suspected, that 
the launch of the European currency would mark 
the start of a journey and that further decisions 
on	 economic	 integration,	 financial	 policy,	 the	
creation	of	a	fiscal	capacity	and	the	coordination	of	
national policies would be needed down the road. 
But they assumed that participation in the euro 
would create momentum and help to tackle future 
issues. It is therefore striking that discussions have 
proved	so	difficult	and	that	since	the	crisis	erupted	
in 2010, so many decisions were only taken on the 
edge of the precipice.5 
There are essentially two possible theories for 
this enduring state of controversy: the ‘battle of 
interests’	and	the	‘battle	of	ideas’.	The	first	posits	
that problems are fundamentally distributional 
– decisions are controversial because they pit 
creditors against debtors, high-debt against low-
debt states, stable against crisis-prone countries, 
or global banks against local banks. The second 
emphasises cognitive issues. According to this 
reading, a major factor behind disagreements is 
that actors do not share the same representation of 
reality, but rather work with different implicit or 
explicit models of it. 
As with any zero-sum game, divergent interests 
may be hard to reconcile but they are analytically 
simple to deal with, because the settling of a 
dispute is regarded by both sides as a purely 
transactional	 matter.	 Divergent	 representations	
may be substantially less divisive because the 
protagonists may ultimately all gain from 
cooperating, but agreement is often harder to reach. 
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Worse, because they reason with different models, 
participants may agree on a solution that leaves 
them actually all worse off.6 As emphasised by 
Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015), it is essential to settle 
on lasting and effective responses, to start from an 
intellectual consensus on the causes of the crisis.     
Richard	 Cooper’s	 study	 of	 nineteenth	 century	
international cooperation in public health 
provides a telling example of a battle of ideas 
(Cooper, 1989). Public health is an interesting case 
to study because there cannot be any doubt that all 
countries share a common interest in containing 
the	 propagation	 of	 diseases.	 Distributional	
dimensions can therefore be assumed to be 
minimal.	 However,	 it	 took	 no	 less	 than	 five	
decades and seven international conferences to 
reach an effective international agreement on 
the prevention of cholera, because participants 
in the negotiations adhered to opposing models 
of disease transmission. The contagionist school 
assumed that transmission essentially takes place 
through contact and advocated long quarantines, 
whereas the miasmatic school emphasised poor 
sanitary conditions and advocated local sanitation. 
On	 several	 occasions,	 fierce	negotiations	 resulted	
in a compromise on a short quarantine. This was 
an ineffective solution under both models, and for 
this reason it was not implemented. It is only when 
the intellectual dispute was resolved (essentially 
by acknowledging that the miasmatic school was 
right) that a lasting solution could be found.            
In	 the	 euro	 context,	 the	 ‘battle	 of	 interests’	
view offers an appropriate lens for analysing 
controversies over legacy issues – debts, non-
performing loans (NPLs), real exchange rate 
misalignments and imbalances – and in general 
everything	 categorised	 as	 ‘risk	 reduction	 issues’	
in the jargon. But as analysed by Brunnermeier et 
al.	 (2016)	 and	 Mahfouz	 and	 Pisani-Ferry	 (2016),	
there are other, long-standing controversies over 
the rules of the policy game and the role of policy 
institutions that cannot be understood until 
their genuinely cognitive dimension is taken into 
account. 
This type of reading is particularly suited to the 
analysis	 of	 Franco-German	 debates.	 True,	 official	
views on banking union on both sides are coloured 
by interests – France is home to several of the largest 
European banks, whereas the German banking 
system is characterised by a much lower degree of 
concentration and a mostly regional reach of the 
6 This is a classic result from the theory of international coordination (see, for example, Frankel and Rockett, 1986). 
7 Burda (2015) claims that German economists do not differ from their European colleagues because they rely on a different 
analytical framework but because they stand for a different national interest. His demonstration, however, fails to convince.  
8 https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/09/27/europe-la-france-et-l-allemagne-doivent-viser-davantage-qu-un-mini-
compromis_5192086_3232.html
vast	majority	of	banking	institutions.	Discussions	
on supervision and deposit insurance, for example, 
are therefore best read within the framework of the 
‘battle	 of	 interests’,	 even	more	 so	 because	 of	 the	
closeness between national banking lobbies and 
national	ministries	of	finance.	But	other	disputes,	
especially on the resolution of the euro crisis and the 
reforms needed to avoid further crises, cannot be 
understood within this perspective. Although the 
two economies have grown dissimilar, particularly 
over the recent decades, it is hard to pin down 
French and German stances over stabilisation, 
moral hazard or the role of discretionary policies 
as the naked expression of interests.7 France and 
Germany have genuinely different perceptions of 
risks and their propagation.
The 7 + 7 initiative
This difference is one of the reasons why a group of 
14 French and German economists (hereafter the 
7 + 7 group) joined forces in September 2017 with 
the aim of forging ambitious proposals for euro 
area reforms. Their fear, as expressed in an initial 
paper, was that the two countries would settle on 
a “small bargain” that “would not make the euro 
area more stable”, that “would not address the 
fundamental	 causes	 of	 why	 fiscal	 rules	 have	 not	
worked well” and that might “induce a false sense 
of security, hindering needed reforms both at the 
national and European levels” – in other words, a 
sort of short quarantine.8 Four months later they 
issued a joint report (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018) 
that started from the recognition that “both the 
French and the German position have a point” 
and stated that making progress without ending 
up with a collection of half-baked compromises 
required	“a	shift	to	reconcile	fiscal	prudence	with	
demand policies and rules with policy discretion”. 
Claiming that “market discipline and risk sharing 
should be viewed as complementary pillars of the 
euro	 area	 financial	 architecture,	 rather	 than	 as	
substitutes”, the 7 + 7 group put forward a series 
of	 proposals	 for	 the	 financial,	 the	 fiscal	 and	 the	
institutional architecture of the euro area (Box 1).
Throughout their joint work, the 7 + 7 group 
never actually bargained over different interests. 
Their common aim was to overcome intellectual 
disagreements stemming from different 
appreciations of risk or different implicit models. 
As is standard among economists, they started 
from the desirable properties of the target 
regime, rather than from the current situation. 
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Legacy issues such as the high public debt ratio 
of some euro countries or the strong home bias 
exhibited by bank balance sheets were taken on 
board at a later stage, when addressing transition 
from one equilibrium to another.
Figure 1 Trade-offs versus efficiency: A stylised 
representation
Euro area today
Sensible
Compromise
Responsibility
Euro area 
possibility frontier
Solidarity
The 7 + 7 group furthermore shared the conviction 
that negotiation on the basis of national 
‘objectives’	 and	 ‘red	 lines’,	 as	 traditionally	
practiced, was bound to constrain the outcome 
to inferior solutions. As illustrated in Figure 1,9 
they saw for example the discussion over trade-
offs between German-inspired responsibility and 
French-inspired solidarity as essentially pointless 
as long as the solution set under discussion 
remained	 situated	 inside	 the	 efficiency	 frontier.	 
There was, in their view, room for simultaneous 
improvement on both accounts.
9	 	This	representation	was	first	proposed	by	Jakob	von	Weizsäcker	in	a	comment	on	the	7	+	7	report.	
In	 the	 7	 +	 7	 group’s	 view,	 a	 reason	 why	 such	
improvement on both axes was regarded as 
possible was a strong, but generally neglected 
complementarity	 between	 risk-sharing	 and	 fiscal	
discipline. Far from being antagonistic, they 
thought that both aims could go hand in hand for 
the following reasons: 
• A common deposit insurance – a solidarity 
device – protects banks from runs and 
helps	 to	 break	 the	 ‘doom	 loop’.	 Hence,	 debt	
restructuring becomes a more feasible option, 
which strengthens market discipline.
• A common safe asset helps banks to diversify 
away from domestic sovereign bonds. Hence, it 
contributes	to	delinking	sovereigns	from	‘their’	
banks and to making market discipline more 
credible and more effective.  
• Precautionary	 liquidity	 lines	 for	 pre-qualified	
countries help to cushion shocks but also 
incentivise	fiscal	responsibility.		
• Temporary stabilising transfers to cushion severe 
economic disturbances alleviate the burden on 
national	 fiscal	 policies,	 therefore	 contributing	
to	fiscal	sustainability.
• Overall, risk-sharing arrangements make the 
no-bailout rule easier to enforce and therefore 
more credible.
Box 1
Key proposals of the 7 + 7 report
1. Reform of fiscal rules, including of the enforcement device
• Introduce debt-corrected expenditure rule (acyclical discretionary spending)
• Ditch	EU	sanctions,	assign	more	individual	responsibility	to	countries
2. More and better risk sharing
• Reduce home bias in bank sovereign portfolios through concentration charges
• Introduce common deposit insurance with national compartments
• Promote	‘safe	asset’	based	on	diversified	sovereign	debt	portfolio	(e.g.	ESBies)
• Create	low-conditionality	access	to	ESM	liquidity	for	pre-qualified	countries
• Create unemployment/employment reinsurance fund
3. A targeted role for market discipline
• Enforce	the	fiscal	rule	via	mandating	the	issuance	of	subordinated	(junior)	bonds	for	 
the	financing	of	excess	spending
• Make	sovereign	debt	restructuring	a	credible	last	resort	when	debt	is	clearly	unsustainable
4. Clarify role of institutions
• Separate	‘prosecutor’	(watchdog)	and	‘judge’	(political)
• Upgrade	ESM	to	IMF-like	institution,	introduce	political	accountability
• Strengthen	national	fiscal	councils
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The debate over the report
Although it was discussed at various stages with 
senior	officials	from	both	sides,	and	although	ideas	
therein – such as debt one-limb collective action 
clauses	for	sovereign	debt,	ESM	liquidity	lines	for	
prequalified	 countries,	 and	 employment-based	
or unemployment-based temporary stabilisation 
mechanisms – made their way to the French-
German	roadmap	issued	by	the	ministers	of	finance	
a	few	days	before	the	Meseberg	meeting,10	it	is	fair	
to say that the gist of the report was not endorsed 
by the French and German authorities. France 
was circumspect on the concentration charges 
and uncomfortable with the acknowledgement 
that debt restructuring had to feature as a last-
resort option, because it feared being dragged 
into accepting some form of automaticity. It was 
sympathetic to deposit insurance, but unwilling 
to spend much political capital on it. Germany 
was politically unhappy with the emphasis on 
a European deposit insurance scheme and had 
reservations about the proposal for a stabilisation 
fund, whose functioning would involve at least 
temporary	fiscal	transfers.	Both	governments	were	
doubtful of the junior bonds and the common 
safe asset (and they actually closed the door to 
sovereign bond-backed securities, or SBBSs, in 
their joint June 2018 roadmap). And neither 
France nor Germany was keen on questioning the 
effectiveness of the Stability and Growth Pact in 
the way the report did. 
The	 report	 was	 influential,	 however,	 in	 that	 it	
helped to structure discussions on euro area 
reform. Presentations have been made at the 
European Parliament, the European Commission, 
the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), 
the	European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM),	the	ECB	
and	 the	 IMF,	 as	well	 as	 to	 treasuries	 and	 central	
banks in Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy 
and Spain. It was discussed in a series of seminars, 
elicited	 significant	 interest	 in	 the	 community	 of	
economists and triggered a series of discussions 
within the profession. In April 2018, a debate 
was opened on VoxEU which11 had attracted 25 
contributions by the end of August.12        
The contributions to the VoxEU debate provide an 
interesting collection of views and are indicative 
of the discussions triggered by the proposals 
of the 7 + 7 report. The sample is admittedly 
biased – few contributions emanated from the 
Northern European conservative school, whose 
strong reservations towards the very principle 
of a new stabilisation instrument were forcefully 
10 https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/PDF/2018/Finances-Euro_Area_Roadmap-EN.pdf
11 I moderated the debate jointly with Jeromin Zettelmeyer. 
12 New contributions have been posted since September. However, they are less about the report than about further proposals and 
the debate about them. 
13 https://vm.fi/documents/10623/6305483/Position+EMU+Denmark+Estonia+Finland+Ireland+Latvia+Lithuania+the+Netherla
nds+and+Sweden.pdf/99e70c41-6348-4c06-8ff8-ed2965d16700/Position+EMU+Denmark+Estonia+Finland+Ireland+Latvia+Li
thuania+the+Netherlands+and+Sweden.pdf.pdf
expressed	in	the	paper	by	eight	finance	ministers	
at the initiative of the Netherlands.13 Although 
well-represented at the national level in several 
countries – and despite invitations to contribute 
– this school of thought largely abstained from 
entering	the	debate	on	EMU	reform.		
In contrast, several of the contributors criticised 
the report for not going far enough, especially 
on	 fiscal	 stabilisation	 and	 liquidity	 provision.	 In	
one	 contribution	 to	 the	 debate,	 Bofinger	 (2018)	
even expressed the view that the balance between 
stabilisation and discipline was so tilted towards 
the	latter	that	implementing	the	report’s	proposals	
would make the euro area worse off. The opinion 
that in a steady state, it would be a “game-changer 
in the wrong direction” was not shared by the 
other contributors, however.  
The main debates triggered by the report can be 
grouped	under	five	headings:	
• First, which is the right strategy for addressing 
legacy	problems?	
• Second, should the debate on euro area reform 
focus	 on	 its	 fiscal	 and	financial	 features,	 or	 is	
there	a	need	for	a	significant	discussion	for	the	
monetary	dimension,	too?	
• Third,	 should	 the	 fiscal	 architecture	 be	
overhauled	or	reformed	at	the	margin?	
• Fourth, what are the conditions for completing 
the	 reform	 of	 the	 financial	 architecture	
undertaken in 2012 with the launch of the 
banking	union?	
• And	fifth,	do	the	7	+	7	group’s	proposals	suffer	
from	 a	 Northern	 bias?	 Legacy	 versus	 system	
design 
Legacy versus system design
As already indicated, the 7 + 7 group did not 
emphasise proposals to address problems inherited 
from the past (what economists call legacy 
problems), but rather proposed ideas for a better 
permanent regime. This does not mean that they 
started from a clean slate and overlooked these 
legacy issues. Rather, the features of the proposed 
permanent regime and the transition leading to it 
were conceived in such a way that it was intended 
to allow countries with high public debt or weak 
banking sectors to take part in it. 
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Because	of	its	public	finances	and	relatively	recent	
banking sector troubles, Italy is an especially 
testing	case.	Bini-Smaghi	(2018)	and	Micossi	(2018)	
implicitly or explicitly wonder if the proposed 
regime would increase its vulnerability; Tabellini 
(2018) goes one step further and argues that it 
would be dangerously destabilising for high-debt 
countries and the euro area as a whole. But the 
proposed solution has also elicited criticism from 
the opposite angle: as explained in his contribution, 
Lars Feld, who was initially part of the 7 + 7 group, 
did	not	endorse	the	final	report	because	he	thought	
it involved the risk of a distributional bias in favour 
of high-debt countries (Feld, 2018). His reasoning 
is	that	lack	of	fiscal	space	at	national	level	would	
inevitably lead them to draw disproportionately 
on	 common	 fiscal	 facilities.	 As	 his	 contribution	
makes clear, he is not convinced that the devices 
introduced	to	limit	this	risk	–	prequalification,	co-
payment,	thresholds,	etc.	–	would	be	sufficient	to	
control it.
An alternative strategy could have been to start 
by addressing the legacy issues head on through 
some sort of stock operation (a debt work-out and 
the cleaning up the bank balance sheets) even at 
the cost of accepting a degree of mutualisation. 
This was the logic behind the debt redemption 
pact proposed in a report by the German Council 
of Economic Experts (GCEE, 2012) co-authored 
by	Lars	Feld,	Beatrice	Weder	di	Mauro	(one	of	the	
7 + 7 group, and at that time a member of the 
GCEE) and others – get rid of the shadow of the 
past, so that the steady-state system can remain 
based	on	the	original	Maastricht	assignment	that	
made individual member states responsible for 
stabilisation. Under this logic, it is better to show 
a limited amount of solidarity to restore national 
fiscal	 space	 now	 than	 to	 commit	 to	 open-ended	
solidarity in the future.
An	 objection	 to	 Feld’s	 approach	 is	 that	 the	 7	
+	 7	 group’s	 proposals	 are	 not	 simply	 –	 or	 even	
primarily	 –	 intended	 to	 find	 a	 way	 around	 the	
present	lack	of	fiscal	space.	They	aim	at	addressing	
systemic	weaknesses	in	the	design	of	the	Maastricht	
system that were revealed by the crisis. These 
problems would persist even if all public debt were 
magically	 reduced	 to	 60%	 of	 GDP	 and	 all	 bank	
NPLs were suddenly eliminated. The vulnerability 
of individual sovereigns that was revealed by the 
crisis was not exclusively the result of excessive 
debt accumulation, but also of their inherent 
fragility in the context of a monetary union. Such 
problems must be addressed systemically.  
Another objection to the approach of proposing 
one-time solidarity in exchange for a return to 
the	Maastricht	system	is	its	questionable	political	
feasibility. The proposal for a debt redemption 
pact	was	first	formulated	seven	years	ago.	Even	at	
the height of the crisis, it was at best considered 
with polite interest in policy circles. Even in the 
case of Greece, for which debt unsustainability 
remains manifest, no agreement has been found to 
proceed to a genuine stock operation, and the long 
shadow of the past will affect policy choices in the 
decades	to	come.	To	put	it	simply,	states’	revealed	
preference is to avoid paying now.
Monetary dimensions
Redenomination risk
The 7 + 7 report has been criticised for not 
addressing redenomination risk (Bini Smaghi, 
2018;	Cohen-Setton	and	Vallée,	2018;	De	Grauwe	
and	Ji,	2018;	Domenech	et al., 2018; Watt, 2018). 
It is true that in the report, the risk that markets 
would price an exit from the euro area – as opposed 
to pricing merely the solvency risk – is mentioned 
only once and that the corresponding response, 
the	 ECB’s	 Outright	 Monetary	 Transactions	
(OMT)	 instrument,	 is	 not	 mentioned	 at	 all.	 But	
as	 explained	 by	 Farhi	 and	Martin	 (2018),	 one	 of	
the important aims of the authors was in fact to 
address and diminish redenomination risk. 
Although this aim should have been spelled out 
more explicitly, there is in fact little substantial 
ambiguity on this point. The report adamantly 
advocates resolving sovereign debt crises through 
restructuring inside the euro area rather than 
through exiting from it. Indeed, the reduction of 
the cost of restructuring the report called for would 
logically diminish the threat of exit. Furthermore, 
proposals	 to	 break	 the	 ‘doom	 loop’	 for	 good	
(through concentration charges on bank balance 
sheets, a common deposit insurance and the 
introduction of a safe asset) would help contain 
the	risk	of	self-fulfilling	exit	expectations.					
The role of the ECB
A related criticism is that the 7 + 7 report did not 
discuss the role of the ECB and did not mention 
the	 Outright	 Monetary	 Transactions	 programme	
(Cohen-Setton and Vallée, 2018; Wolff, 2018). 
Again,	 this	 is	 factually	 true,	 as	 the	 report’s	 focus	
was on the agenda for intergovernmental Franco-
German discussions, which were (fortunately) 
not expected to cover issues related to the way 
an	 independent	 ECB	 fulfils	 its	 mandate.	 But	
whereas the 7 + 7 group deliberately abstained 
from discussing central bank policy, they worked 
under the assumption that the ECB would 
continue	 tackling	 the	 risk	 of	 self-fulfilling	 crises,	 
including	through	activating	the	OMT	if	necessary	
(Farhi	 and	Martin,	 2018).	 So,	 there	 is	 in	 fact	 no	
neglect of central bank policy matters.
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A number of issues do, however, deserve further 
discussion. Cohen-Setton and Vallée (2018) argue 
that the ECB should backstop the sovereign bond 
market of a solvent country even in the absence of 
a conditional assistance programme. While the 7 + 
7	group	argue	that	a	‘prequalified’	solvent	country	
should	 be	 granted	 access	 to	 an	 ESM	 liquidity	
window without being required to change its 
policy,	the	official	ECB	doctrine	remains	that	the	
OMT	 can	 only	 be	 activated	 in	 complement	 to	
national reform efforts (Cœuré, 2013). If access to 
ESM	liquidity	is	granted	to	a	prequalified	country	
without ex-post conditionality, this should 
logically	apply	to	the	OMT	as	well.	This	point	could	
have been made explicitly in the 7 + 7 report.  
An	alternative	approach,	argued	by	Vihriälä	(2018),	
would	be	 to	give	 the	ESM	access	 to	ECB	 funding	
for	 the	 financing	 of	 precautionary	 lending	 (as	
opposed to standard conditional assistance, which 
would	continue	being	financed	on	the	basis	of	the	
resources provided by the member states). Both 
approaches would address a number of concerns 
with	 the	 status	 quo:	 that	 the	 €500	 billion	 ESM	
capacity may quickly be exhausted in a liquidity 
crisis, that it is not appropriate to endow the ECB 
with the responsibility of deciding whether or 
not to provide support to sovereigns, and that 
conditioning liquidity support on an adjustment 
programme is likely to delay its activation 
excessively.
Fiscal architecture
Debt restructuring 
The	 7	 +	 7	 report	 has	 been	 criticised	 by	 officials	
and observers for advocating quasi-automatic 
sovereign debt restructuring and for taking the 
risk	 of	 corresponding	 financial	 trouble	 lightly.	
In fact, it emphatically rejected both numerical 
thresholds and procedural automaticity (such as 
the automatic roll-over of standard bonds coming 
to	redemption	during	an	ESM	programme).	As	far	
as debt sustainability is concerned, the 7 + 7 report 
made two proposals: 
• Debt	 restructuring	 should	 be	 considered	 as	 a	
last-resort option for insolvent sovereigns. The 
no bail-out rule – that is, the principle that 
the	 ESM	 does	 not	 lend	 to	 an	 insolvent	 state	
– would be upheld but exactly in the way the 
same	principle	is	implemented	by	the	IMF	(i.e.	
lending would be decided on the basis of a debt 
sustainability analysis and would be conditional 
on a high enough probability of sustainability). 
• Debt	 restructuring	 should	 be	 made	 less	
disruptive	 financially	 and	 economically.	 For	
the most part, this would be achieved by better 
protecting	the	financial	system	from	sovereign	
risk (eliminating concentrated exposures and 
creating a safe asset that banks would be induced 
to hold) and through risk sharing mechanisms 
such as euro area deposit insurance. In 
addition, the report argued for the introduction 
of	 ‘single-limb’	 collective	 action	 clauses	 (that	
would make it possible to let creditors pass a 
single vote on a restructuring proposal instead 
of voting separately on the treatment of each 
issuance, which offers the opportunity to retain 
a blocking minority).
A portion of these proposals was endorsed in 
the	 Franco-German	 Meseberg	 declaration	 and	
can now be regarded as being part of the two 
countries’	 policy	 consensus.	 Several	 contributors	
(De	Grauwe	 and	 Ji,	 2018;	 Tabellini,	 2018;	Wolff,	
2018), however, argue that the very existence of 
a sovereign restructuring procedure may trigger 
panic.	Furthermore,	De	Grauwe	and	Ji	–	recalling	
that in the early 2010s, Ireland, Spain and Portugal 
were regarded by some as insolvent, whereas they 
were in fact suffering from a liquidity shortage 
– argue that it is impossible to decide whether a 
government is actually insolvent (a point also 
alluded	to	by	Micossi,	2018).	
This is a fundamental debate. The no-bailout 
rule,	one	of	the	core	principles	of	EMU,	prohibits	
official	 lending	 or	 indirect	 central	 bank	 support	
to an insolvent state. To renege on this principle 
because insolvency is hard to diagnose in real time 
would	amount	to	endorsing	fiscal	dominance.	 In	
the eyes of the German constitutional court, such 
an acknowledgment would in turn amount to an 
infringement	of	the	core	EMU	contract.	So,	there	is	
in fact no choice but to operationalise the principle 
that as a last resort, an insolvent sovereign must 
undergo debt restructuring. When and how it 
should be enforced is a matter of judgement. For 
this reason, this decision should be bestowed 
to a technically apt and politically legitimate 
institution. What institution this should be, what 
would guarantee that it decides even-handedly and 
consistently, and what methodology should guide 
its assessment are admittedly matters for further 
work; but the principle should not be regarded as a 
matter for discussion. Indeed, in his counterfactual 
account of the Greek crisis, Papaconstantinou 
(2018) points out that the lack of an agreed 
framework for debt restructuring contributed to 
unhelpful gambles for redemption. 
Tabellini’s	 critique	 is	 subtler.	 The	 7	 +	 7	 group	
explicitly stated that their proposals aimed at 
making	 a	 last-resort	 restructuring	 financially	 less	
disruptive and economically less damaging, and 
therefore a more credible option. Tabellini argues 
that	 this	 would	 be	 reflected	 in	 the	 risk	 premia	
applied to high-debt countries. The proposed 
solution would therefore impose a penalty on 
countries like Italy. For these countries it would 
not make things better, but worse.  
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In their response, Pisani-Ferry and Zettelmeyer 
(2018) acknowledge that for any given solvency 
situation of a country remaining in the euro area, 
the	 7	 +	 7	 group’s	 proposals	 would	 increase	 the	
probability of restructuring. They argue, however, 
that this need not imply a higher risk premium. 
First, the solvency of the participating countries 
cannot be regarded as exogenous, but is likely to 
improve as a result of the proposed policy regime 
through	stronger	incentives	to	fiscal	responsibility	
and a reduction in the chances that countries will 
become insolvent as a result of bad shocks or self-
fulfilling	panics,	given	the	risk-sharing	mechanisms	
and weakening of the link between banks and 
sovereigns. Second, Tabellini neglects the fact 
that providing for orderly restructuring inside the 
euro area may well reduce the probability of an 
insolvent country being expelled from it, and the 
corresponding currency redenomination premium 
paid by sovereign borrowers. 
Fiscal rule
Had	the	7	+	7	group’s	criticism	of	the	Stability	and	
Growth Pact (SGP) been formulated a few years ago, 
it would certainly have elicited a strong rebuttal, 
especially	 from	 official	 circles.	 The	 fact	 that	 few	
commentators disputed it is indicative of the 
evolution of the debate. Only Bini-Smaghi (2018) 
regards	 its	 negative	 assessment	 as	 unjustified,	
whereas Beetsma and Larch (2018) speak of an 
“excessively complex system of rules that few 
understand”, and Wieser (2018) bluntly claims that 
the present rules-based SGP has become “nearly 
unmanageable”. Wieser is even harsher than the 
7 + 7 group, arguing that the present system has 
produced	 short-termism,	 fine	 tuning	 of	 the	 rule	
book and political loss of legitimacy. 
Beetsma and Larch point out a “surprising 
convergence of views” on how to overhaul the SGP. 
They	regard	the	essential	tenet	of	the	7	+	7	group’s	
proposals – an expenditure rule based on potential 
GDP	growth	but	adjusted	to	address	situations	of	
excessive public debt – as a potentially consensual 
solution that would reduce procyclicality, provide 
a basis to streamline the current system and help 
to limit the recourse to escape clauses. 
The proposed rule was criticised by some for 
continuing to depend on unobservable variables. It 
is true that potential output growth is not directly 
observed, so that controversy on the proper 
assessment of it would remain. But an expenditure 
ceiling based on potential output would create 
much less noise than the current approach based 
on the current and projected output gaps.   
Two further controversial points in the 7 + 7 
group’s	 proposals	 are,	 first,	 the	 possibility	 left	
to governments to depart from the agreed rule 
provided	 they	 finance	 additional	 expenditures	
through the issuance of junior bonds and, second, 
the reform of the institutional set-up.
Junior bonds
In agreement with the view taken on the SGP and 
the need to make governments more responsible 
for their own mistakes, the 7 + 7 report advocated 
the	introduction	of	fixed-duration	junior	bonds	for	
the	financing	of	expenditures	over	and	above	the	
ceiling given by the national spending rule. These 
bonds – and only these bonds – would undergo an 
automatic	maturity	 extension	 in	 case	 of	 an	 ESM	
programme. But as they would presumably be 
issued	 in	 small	 quantities	 to	 finance	 departures	
from the agreed expenditure rule, the bulk of the 
public debt stock would remain unaffected.    
The idea stems from political considerations – at 
a time when the policy consensus of the 1990s 
has eroded, the EU should avoid being held 
responsible	for	imposing	a	fiscal	straightjacket	that	
would offer an easy target to populist grievances. 
Rather, governments should be free to make 
their own choices and try to convince markets 
that their policies might actually work. But they 
would	be	 legally	compelled	 to	finance	additional	
expenditures	or	tax	cuts	through	standardised	five-
year bonds that would be subject to automatic 
maturity	extension	in	case	of	an	ESM	programme	
and	would	be	the	first	to	suffer	a	haircut	in	case	of	
restructuring.
Echoing	 concerns	 often	 heard	 in	 official	 circles,	
Buti et al. (2018) fear that junior bonds, though 
clearly distinct from standard bonds, would 
provide a conduit for transmitting destabilising 
market	reactions.	Increased	probability	of	an	ESM	
programme, the reasoning goes, would lead to a 
freeze of the secondary junior bond market that 
could spill over onto the market for standard 
bonds. Although not subject to maturity extension, 
the latter would suffer from the deteriorating 
reputation of the issuer. Ultimately, the entire 
bond market could freeze prematurely. 
There is indeed no experience of issuance of such 
bonds by sovereigns, and even private-sector 
experience is limited in this regard. The proposal 
in the 7 + 7 report is that junior bonds would be 
(i) optional in the sense that countries can avoid 
them by observing the pre-announced expenditure 
ceiling; (ii) standardised, so that they would be 
clearly distinguishable from regular bonds; and 
(iii)	 subject	 to	 a	 specific	 regulatory	 treatment.	
These provisions should limit the risk of spillover 
onto the regular bond market.  
Other objections are that the market for junior 
bonds	 would	 be	 thin,	 that	 financial	markets	 are	
subject to wide gyrations in their assessments, and 
that it would be hard to establish and enforce a legal 
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obligation	 to	 finance	 excessive	 deficits	 by	 junior	
bonds. These are real concerns, but the proposal by 
Beetsma and Larch to suspend the disbursement of 
EU funds to a country in infringement of the rules 
would not be easy to implement either. Ultimately, 
what must be found is a balance between two 
imperfect institutional arrangements: one that 
relies on peer pressure underpinned by legal 
obligations, and one that relies on market pressure. 
Neither is failproof.   
Purple bonds 
A dual sovereign bond market structure is 
also	 advocated	 by	 Bini-Smaghi	 and	 Marcussen	
(2018),	 but	 in	 a	 different	 way.	 Drawing	 on	 the	
‘blue	 bonds-red	 bonds’	 proposal	 of	 Delpla	 and	
Weizsäcker	(2010),	they	propose	the	introduction	
of	 ‘purple	bonds’	that	would	benefit	from	a	non-
restructuring	guarantee	under	an	ESM	programme.	
In a permanent regime, to be reached at a 20-year 
horizon, each sovereign would be allowed to issue 
such	bonds	up	to	60%	of	its	GDP.	Additional	bonds	
(dubbed red) could be issued, but as they would 
not	 benefit	 from	 the	 same	 guarantee,	 the	 risk	 of	
restructuring would be priced in and, as in the case 
of junior bonds, they would serve as a channel for 
market discipline.    
To avoid destabilisation, Bini-Smaghi and 
Marcussen	 envisage	 granting	 the	 purple	 bond	
status to the entire stock of public debt outstanding. 
Gradually however, new issuances would be 
guaranteed only for an amount corresponding to 
compliance with the Fiscal Compact. The rest, if 
any, would have to be issued in the form of red 
bonds. To be concrete, a country that starts from 
a	 100%	debt-to-GDP	 ratio	would	 need	 to	 reduce	
it by two percentage points per year to bring it 
to 60% within 20 years. The stock of purple debt 
would therefore be gradually reduced over this 20-
year transition period. 
The purple bonds proposal would in a way achieve 
the stock operation mentioned earlier. Apart 
from the fact that objections to the junior bonds 
proposal would also apply to the red bonds, it 
raises	the	question	of	whether	the	ESM	can	extend	
a no-restructuring guarantee to all existing public 
debt. This would commit it ex ante to the type of 
concessionary lending currently granted to Greece, 
to	the	benefit	of	any	country	whose	present	level	
of public debt would prove unsustainable. Initially, 
the introduction of such a guarantee would remove 
market incentives to discipline altogether. It would 
therefore	need	to	be	accompanied	by	a	significant	
strengthening	of	the	institutional	fiscal	framework,	
whose likelihood appears uncertain. And as also 
discussed already, political appetite for an ex ante 
transfer, even a contingent one, seems limited.
Institutional set-up
The 7 + 7 report claimed that the institutional 
architecture	 of	 fiscal	 surveillance	 should	
be	 reformed,	 first	 by	 assigning	 more	 fiscal	
responsibility	 to	 national	 fiscal	 councils,	 and	
second	by	better	separating	the	role	of	‘prosecutor’	
and	 ‘judge’.	 The	 latter	 would	 be	 done	 either	
by assigning different tasks to the Commission 
and the chair of the Eurogroup or, if the role of 
chairing the Eurogroup were assigned to the ECFIN 
Commissioner, by separating functions within 
the Commission. The discussion of these issues is 
bound to gain in importance as there seems to be 
wide	 agreement	 that	 the	 role	 of	 the	 ESM	 should	
be strengthened. It is also easy to be sceptical, 
as Wieser (2018) is, about the actual degree of 
independence	of	national	fiscal	watchdogs.	Further	
debate is likely on how to avoid duplication and 
rivalry between European institutions, and how to 
ensure	that	fiscal	responsibility	is	better	rooted	in	
credible domestic institutions.           
Tabellini (2018) raises an important institutional 
point when observing that decision making for 
the	granting	of	ESM	assistance	is	dominated	by	the	
creditors.	Could	 then	 the	 ESM	be	 endowed	with	
the	responsibility	of	assessing	debt	sustainability?	
Or should a more neutral institution be in charge 
of	 this	 assessment?	 Pisani-Ferry	 and	 Zettelmeyer	
(2018) share his concern about the independence 
of the sustainability assessment provided by the 
ESM	 staff,	 but	 disagree	 on	 the	 precondition	 that	
the	 ESM	 be	 transformed	 into	 an	 EU	 institution	
operating under majority rule and accountable 
to the European Parliament. In their view, this is 
simply too high a bar.  
Fiscal stabilisation and fiscal capacity 
The	Maastricht	policy	assignment	was	remarkably	
clear	 and	 simple:	 reflecting	 the	 consensus	 of	 the	
time, monetary policy was regarded a strong 
enough instrument for addressing area-wide 
shocks whereas, provided governments played by 
the	rules,	national	fiscal	policies	were	supposed	to	
enjoy	sufficient	margins	of	manoeuvre	within	the	
constraints	 of	 the	 SGP	 to	 tackle	 country-specific	
shocks. 
These hypotheses have been seriously questioned 
by the economic developments of the last decade. 
Contrary to the view of the early 2000s (Taylor, 
2000),	 fiscal	 policy	 is	 increasingly	 regarded	 as	
a necessary complement to monetary policy, 
especially in situations when the latter is 
constrained by the zero lower bound (Furman, 
2016); and market reactions, or the fear of them, 
can	prevent	national	fiscal	policy	from	playing	its	
stabilisation role when a country is hit by a large 
shock. Hence the need to reconsider the role of 
fiscal	policy	in	EMU.
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The 7 + 7 report aimed to provide a response to 
the second problem – how to help individual 
countries deal with large shocks – by proposing a 
fiscal	stabilisation	scheme	based	on	the	evolution	
of employment or unemployment indicators. The 
idea	was	also	endorsed	by	the	IMF	(Arnold	et al., 
2018). The proposed system would take the form 
of	 a	 fund,	 financed	 by	 national	 contributions,	
that would provide one-off transfers to countries 
experiencing a sudden and large change in the 
employment or unemployment rate. Contributions 
would be set in such a way that it would not give 
rise to one-way recurring transfers. A similar idea 
was outlined in the French-German roadmap, but 
without	transfers.	In	the	ministers’	proposal	of	June	
2018, large shocks would merely elicit loans. Loans, 
however, may not provide effective stabilisation in 
a situation where countries fear being cut off from 
access to liquidity,14 and furthermore they could 
result in lasting disputes between creditors and 
debtors. 
As	 to	 the	 first	 problem,	 the	 report	 fell	 short	
of proposing a euro area budget or a central 
fiscal	 capacity	 able	 to	 cover	 aggregate	 shocks.	 It	
recognised	 that	aggregate	fiscal	 support	might	be	
desirable, but argued that a euro budget could 
only be the result of decisions regarding common 
public goods and the institutional underpinnings 
of	their	financing.	
Apart	from	Peter	Bofinger,	commentators	generally	
regard the stabilisation proposals of the 7 + 7 
report	 as	 positive,	 though	 insufficient	 (Dullien,	
2018;	Doménech	 et al., 2018; Watt, 2018; Wolff, 
2018).	Dullien,	 for	 example,	 points	 out	 that	had	
the proposed scheme been in operation prior to 
the crisis, Spain would have received in total a 
transfer	amounting	to	1.3%	of	its	GDP	and	Ireland	
less than 1%. Though some in Northern Europe 
would regard this number as high, it is certainly 
not commensurate to the stabilisation provided by 
the US federal budget. Several would have wished 
the report propose either a proper budget, or a 
central	fiscal	authority	capable	of	monitoring	and	
steering	the	aggregate	fiscal	stance.	The	challenge	
here, however, is not to demonstrate that the euro 
area would be macroeconomically better off with 
a	 significant	 common	 budget.	 It	 is	 to	 overcome	
either one of two major obstacles: the fact that 
coordination is toothless whenever it comes to 
telling a surplus country that it should relax its 
stance, and the fact that a proper budget requires 
agreeing on the common public goods, revenue, 
and accountability procedures.
Financial architecture
As far as banking union is concerned, the 7 + 7 
report advocated precise steps aiming to break the 
14	 	Research	has	provided	evidence	of	significant	multiplier	non-linearities	 in	conditions	of	market	concerns	over	a	country’s	
fiscal	sustainability.		
‘doom	loop’	for	good.	It	proposed	introducing	(i)	
concentration charges so that banks exhibiting 
(home) bias in the composition of their sovereign 
bonds portfolio would be required to post more 
capital (but no risk-weighting of individual assets, 
which implies that all sovereign bonds would 
continue to be treated in the same way); and (ii) 
a common deposit insurance scheme that would 
guarantee all bank deposits equally but for which 
banks would continue paying different fees 
depending	not	only	on	bank-specific	risk,	but	also	
on the safety of the national banking systems. 
Concentration charges would make it costly for 
national banks to continue to disproportionately 
hold bonds issued by their sovereign. For this 
reason, their introduction would primarily affect 
countries, such as Italy, where banks have behaved 
as the residual buyer of domestic government 
securities. In order to avoid destabilising sovereign 
bond markets, the 7 + 7 report advocated for 
concentration charges to be phased in gradually, 
possibly after having granted grandfathering to all 
existing holdings, and ideally in combination with 
the phase-in of a sovereign bond-backed safe asset 
which would create demand for sovereign bonds 
during the transition phase. Here especially, the 
aim	was	to	define	the	target	of	the	long-term	regime	
and to work out the transition very carefully. 
Deposit insurance
As detailed in Schnabel and Véron (2018a, 
2018b), the scheme for deposit insurance was also 
designed in order to combine the guarantee that 
all deposits are equally safe – a strong deterrent to 
bank	runs	–	and	a	financing	system	avoiding	full	
mutualisation for as long as national authorities 
can	influence	bank	solvency	through	a	variety	of	
policy provisions such as company and household 
bankruptcy procedures. The 7 + 7 scheme 
therefore combined a fully integrated setting with 
differentiated contributions (based on structural 
indicators of creditor rights) and a two-tier waterfall 
financing	 structure	 with	 national	 compartments	
and a common compartment that would start to 
pay out once the national compartment has been 
depleted, and that would be reimbursed over time 
so that the operation of the system would not 
involve any permanent transfer. 
Some critics have argued that this scheme would be 
complex, unnecessary and potentially inadequate. 
Building on simulations, a team of economists at 
the ECB argued that a single fee structure could be 
designed that would ensure a high degree of safety 
and avoid any cross-subsidisation (Carmassi et al., 
2018). They even claim that a reinsurance-type 
structure could have undesirable distributional 
consequences, but their assumed structure differs 
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from that proposed in the 7 + 7 report (because 
it	 assumes	 fixed	 target	 levels	 for	 the	 national	
compartments). Schoenmaker (2018) also criticises 
the proposed system on the ground that the 
replenishment of national compartments could 
be procyclical. So even if an agreement could be 
reached on the principle of a common deposit 
insurance, its design would remain a matter for 
economic debate.   
Safe asset
The 7 + 7 report proposed common synthetic 
safe securities be introduced in parallel to the 
concentration charges so that banks would be 
incentivised	 to	 purchase	 them	 as	 diversification	
assets. The safe asset issue has been part of the euro 
discussion	 at	 least	 since	 Delpla	 and	 Weizsäcker	
(2010) formulated their blue bonds–red bonds 
proposal. Over time several variants were put 
forward, discussed and (generally) discarded but, 
as observed by Buti et al. (2018), versions of the 
idea that involve pooling and tranching but no 
mutualisation have not been fully explored yet. 
The version endorsed in the 7 + 7 report did 
not involve any mutualisation. Instead, the 
authors advocated introducing privately issued 
but regulated sovereign bond-backed securities 
(SBBSs)	 based	 on	 a	 diversified	 portfolio	 of	 euro	
area sovereign bonds. The senior tranche of the 
synthetic asset – what Brunnermeier et al. (2017) 
called ESBies – would constitute a euro area safe 
asset. It would be introduced in parallel to the 
phasing-in of bank concentration charges, from 
which it would be exempt, and would therefore 
constitute an investment vehicle for banks aiming 
at reducing their home bias. The creation of euro 
area safe assets would therefore neither be left to 
private-sector initiative (because of the creation 
of	 a	 specific	 regulatory	 framework)	 nor	 be	 taken	
charge	 of	 by	 an	 official	 institution	 (as	 in	 some	
proposals that envisaged them being issued by the 
ESM).	
Claeys (2018) rightly observes that despite having 
been endorsed by the European Commission 
and the European Systemic Risk Board, SBBSs 
remain controversial and that they are especially 
unpopular with debt management agencies. As 
pointed out by Zettelmeyer and Leandro (2018), 
there	are	three	main	reasons	for	this	distrust:	first,	
the fear that the senior tranche would lose safety 
in a crisis; second, the fear that in adverse market 
conditions, the issuance of synthetic securities 
could be blocked by the lack of buyers for the 
junior and mezzanine tranches; and third, the 
potential spillovers from the synthetic asset on the 
demand for national bonds and the liquidity of the 
corresponding markets. 
Simulations by Zettelmeyer and Leandro (2018) 
suggest that these fears are not without rationale 
–	 indeed,	 the	 SBBS’s	 junior	 tranche	 could	 lose	
market access and the senior tranche could 
be hit by extreme tail risks – but that they are 
largely	 exaggerated.	Distrust	 remains	however,	 as	
demonstrated by the Franco-German roadmap of 
June 2018, which discarded SBBSs out of hand. 
Zettelmeyer and Leandro (2018) also point to 
alternative ideas for creating safe assets that would 
avoid some of the potential disadvantages of SBBS 
while still avoiding mutualisation, albeit at the 
cost of requiring a large public intermediary such 
as	 the	 ESM.	 Whether	 these	 ideas	 stand	 a	 better	
chance politically is not clear, however.
Northern bias
As Frieden (2018) points out, any reform 
programme for the euro area must address the 
concerns of both core and periphery countries. 
Though they intended to help unlock the French-
German discussion, the 7 + 7 group endeavoured 
to propose solutions that would suit all euro area 
members. Several contributors, however, implicitly 
regarded their report as unbalanced and biased 
towards the perspective of Northern member 
states. The critique was most explicitly formulated 
by Tabellini (2018), who claims that the 7 + 7 
report	 “reflects	 the	 nationality	 of	 its	 authors,	
namely two countries that belong to the core of 
the euro area and are not exposed to a considerable 
risk of a sudden stop on their sovereign debt”. He 
argues that the compromise found by the 7 + 7 
group is not suitable for a country exposed to the 
risk of a debt run and that its proposals would in 
fact increase the vulnerabilities of countries with 
high legacy debt.    
Tabellini’s	 critiques	of	 the	knock-on	effect	of	 the	
acceptance of sovereign restructuring as a last-
resort option and of the junior debt instrument 
echo those formulated by other commentators and 
officials.	He	goes	further	than	these	critics,	however,	
in	 arguing	 that	 the	7	 +	 7	 group’s	 obsession	with	
breaking	the	doom	loop	is	a	bad	 idea	 in	the	first	
place. He claims that through acting as residual 
buyers of domestic sovereign bonds in situations 
of stress, national banks play a stabilising role that 
should not be hampered by concentration charges 
or other provisions aiming at the same goal. This 
is in fact a fundamental critique of the direction 
taken	by	EMU	reforms	since	2012,	when	the	heads	
and state and government decided to opt for 
banking union. If domestic banks are to remain 
the safety valve of the sovereign bond market, it is 
fully	rational	for	the	markets’	assessment	of	their	
solvency to be correlated to that of the sovereign. 
This in turn creates a major conduit for overreaction 
in times of economic stress and elevated risk 
aversion. If Italy and countries in similar high-debt 
situations reject the very idea of a bank balance 
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sheet	diversification,	the	logical	implication	will	be	
for	 regulators	 in	financially	 stronger	 countries	 to	
perpetuate, or even intensify, ring-fencing in order 
to	protect	their	financial	systems	from	the	fallout	
of	financial	disorder	across	borders.	That	is	exactly	
what policy architects in the EU have been trying 
to avoid since the crisis erupted in 2010.    
Finally,	some	commentators	(especially	Doménech	
et al.,	2018;	Dullien,	2018;	and	Wolff,	2018)	have	
criticised the 7 + 7 report for what it does not 
address:	 chronic	 external	 surpluses	 or	 deficits,	
structural divergences in growth and endogenous 
boom-bust cycles. The authors of the report are 
certainly the last to deny that these are major issues 
for the sustainability of the euro area. But concerns 
about them should not prevent serious discussions 
about	 the	 flaws	 or	 vulnerabilities	 policy	 system.	
Both must be tackled.   
Conclusion 
The authors of the 7 + 7 report were aiming 
at breaking the deadlock in Franco-German 
discussions and at changing the broader policy 
conversation on euro area reform. It is fair to say 
that	 they	 had	 limited	 success	 on	 the	 first	 point.	
Some of their proposals certainly found their 
way	 to	 the	 Meseberg	 Declaration;	 their	 plea	 for	
an ambitious agreement that exploits the hidden 
complementarities	 between	 the	 ‘French’	 and	
the	 ‘German’	agendas	was	at	 least	heard.	But	the	
overall	architecture	of	the	official	French-German	
compromise is quite different from the one 
proposed in their report. The logic put forward 
by the 7 + 7 group was intellectually coherent, 
but probably not palatable enough politically for 
officials	 from	 France	 and	 Germany	 to	 endorse	
it and build on it. As illustrated by some of the 
contributions prompted by the report, it also 
elicited several guarded or even negative reactions 
from other countries, especially Italy.    
The 7 + 7 group had more success with their 
second aim. As this survey illustrates – and despite 
uneven willingness to engage in the debate on the 
part of the various schools of thought – the tone 
of the discussion has changed in comparison to 
what	it	was	a	year	ago	when	Emmanuel	Macron’s	
ideas started being discussed. Within the group of 
economists who participated in the endeavour, 
there is not a German position and a French 
position anymore. All the 7 + 7 group stand by 
what they have proposed. Nobody can claim 
anymore that French and German economists 
behave as the prisoners of their respective national 
crisis narratives. This is not a minor achievement. 
Furthermore, the report has served as a reference 
point for a much-broadened discussion among 
policymakers and academics. Through its 
questioning of the relevance of well-established 
quarrels – such as the dispute between the advocates 
or risk reduction and the proponents of risk sharing 
– and because it has put forward new options, it 
has helped to break the status quo bias that is so 
pervasive in European policy discussions and to 
clarify which ideas command wide consensus and 
which remain a matter for controversy. Some feel 
that	 the	 7	 +	 7	 group’s	 proposals	 are	 insufficient,	
some that they have gone too far, some that 
they have taken the wrong direction. But such 
controversies	are	definitely	useful.
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